The paper develops a dynamic economic model of a controlled biological invasion. Such problems are inherently non-convex for two reasons. First, the invasion growth function and the set of feasible time paths may be non-convex. Second, non-convexities in the objective function may arise naturally from the fact that control costs depend on the invasion size. The goal of this paper is to characterize the optimal value and policy functions in this non-classical setting with a particular focus on the long run dynamic behavior of an optimally controlled invasion and the corresponding implications for public policy. The value function may be non-convex and the optimal control may be a non-monotonic function of the invasion size. When costs depend on both control and the invasion size the optimal transition function for an invasion is not necessarily monotonic and optimal time paths may exhibit nonlinear dynamics; as a result, it may be optimal to let the invasion grow before eradication and there may be alternating intervals of eradication and non-eradication on the state space. We characterize these possibilities as well as the conditions under which it is optimal to eradicate an invasive species (immediately and eventually), the conditions under which maintenance control is optimal, and the conditions under which it is not efficient to control an invasive species at all.
1 For example, the costs of controlling the zebra mussel (Dreissena polymorpha) in the Great Lakes are expected to reach $5 billion in 2001 [USGS, 2000] while the Russian wheat aphid (Diuraphis noxia) caused an estimated $600 million (1991 ( $) in crop damages between 1987 ( and 1989 ( [OTA, 1993 . The invasion of Guam by the brown tree snake (Boiga irregularis) demonstrates the ecological harm an invader can cause. Since its introduction in the mid-twentieth century it has caused the extinction of 12 of the island Ns bird species [Savidge, 1987; Rodda, Fritts and Chiszar, 1997] . 2 In 1990 the U.S. Congress passed the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act to deal with the increasing problems of invasive species in waterways. In 1996 the act was amended to become the National Invasive Species Act. In 1992 the Alien Species Prevention and Enforcement Act was passed to protect Hawaii from 1
Introduction
Throughout history the spread of plants, animals and other organisms has been governed by natural ecological processes and has accompanied the movement of humans. The process of globalization and greater mobility of humans and goods around the world has increased the introduction of species to areas outside their native habitat. Biological invasion -the invasion of ecological systems by non-indigenous species, is a very important component of global environmental change [Vitousek et. al., 1996] and imposes significant economic and ecological damages. In the United States alone, the number of harmful invasive species is in the thousands and the total costs of non-indigenous species have been estimated to be at least $137 billion per year [Pimentel, et. al., 2000] . Approximately one-fourth of the value of the country Ns agricultural output is lost to non-indigenous plant pests or the costs of controlling them [Simberloff, 1996] . Invasive species also cause significant ecological harm. They can alter ecosystem processes, act as vectors of disease, and reduce biodiversity [Vitousek, et. al., 1996] .
Worldwide, out of 256 vertebrate extinctions with an identifiable cause, 109 are known to be due to biological invaders. In comparison, 70 such extinctions are known to be caused by human exploitation [Cox, 1993] . It is estimated that forty percent of the threatened or endangered species in the United States are at risk due to pressures from invading species [The Nature Conservancy, 1996; Wilcove et. al., 1998 ]. In some instances a single invasive species can cause tremendous economic and/or ecological damage.
1 Not surprisingly, the past decade has seen a sizeable growth in public policy directed toward invasive species.
the introduction of prohibited plants, plant pests and injurious animals. In 1999 President Clinton created the National Invasive Species Council. Subsequently, the Council drafted the National Invasive Species Management Plan to develop a national strategy for combating problems of invasive species. In 1997, the Global Invasive Species Programme was established by the Scientific Committee for Problems of the Environment (SCOPE), in collaboration with the United Nations Environment Programme, The World Conservation Union, DIVERSITAS (an international programme on biodiversity science) and the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau International.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the economics of controlling a biological invasion by a single species where the objective is to minimize the discounted sum of damage and control costs. The aim is to understand the economic and biological conditions that determine the optimal control of an invasion over time in a framework that adequately captures some of the important stylized facts about the nature of control costs and the natural growth of invasive species. Such an understanding is important because, as we will show, the optimal policy may be characterized by non-linear dynamics and may exhibit a wide range of outcomes even in a one-dimensional model. Our results characterize the different outcomes in terms of joint properties of the biological growth of the invasion, control costs, damages and the social discount rate.
The state of the invasion, or its capital stock, is defined by its size. Depending on the context, the size of an invasion may be the area contained within the frontal boundary of the invasion, the population, or the biomass of the invasive species. The spread of an established invasive species is typically characterized by three distinct phases [Shigesada and Kawasaki, 1997] . The first is an initial establishment phase during which little or no expansion occurs. This is followed by an expansion phase where the population and range of the invasive species increases. Finally, there is a saturation phase as the invasion approaches geographical, climatic, or ecological limits to its range. The model of this paper accommodates invasions that exhibit almost any pattern of establishment, expansion, and saturation, including those where the invasion is governed by a non-convex or S-shaped biological growth function.
Control of an invasive species is achieved by reducing the size of the invasion by chemical, biological, manual, or other means. In this paper, control is an aggregate measure of the reduction in the size of the invasion by the various inputs used for control. It typically costs less to achieve a given amount of control from a large invasion than it does from a small invasion. In other words, control costs depend on both the amount controlled (the reduction in the size of the invasion) and on the size of the invasion being controlled. In some cases the dependence of control costs on the invasion size is such that the marginal costs of control vary more with the invasion size than they do with control. For example, historical attempts to eradicate invasive species indicate that it may cost as much to remove the last one to ten percent of an invasion as it does to control the initial ninety to ninety-nine percent [Myers, et. al., 1998 ].
Together, control costs that depend on the invasion size and non-convex invasion growth have important implications. The marginal social cost of an invasion is likely to be higher when the invasion is growing at a fast rate than when the invasion is growing at a slow rate. With a non-convex growth function this means that the marginal social cost is likely to be low at small invasion sizes, higher for intermediate invasion sizes, and lower again at very high invasion sizes where the growth rate is small.
In other words, with non-convex growth the value function or the minimum dynamic social cost of an invasion is typically not convex. This has three consequences. First, a larger invasion size does not necessarily call for greater control and the optimal control may be non-monotonic in the size of invasion. This is true even if the optimal time path of the invasion is monotonic. Second, the marginal benefit from preventing the import of an established invasive species is not necessarily increasing in the size of the current invasion and this should be accounted for in the formulation of optimal prevention policies such as port-inspections or trade restrictions. Finally, there may be multiplicities and discontinuities in the optimal policy, and there are more likely to be corner solutions where the optimal policy involves either no control or complete eradication.
The dependence of control cost on the invasion size has a separate set of policy implications.
One reason is that policy must account for the fact that an increase in control has two opposing effects on future net benefits. First, it lowers future damages. Second, by reducing the invasion size it increases future control costs. The second effect provides an economic incentive to postpone control and can lead to outcomes where an optimally managed invasion may exhibit cyclical or complex dynamics. For example, it may be optimal to use periodic control where an invasion is allowed to grow unchecked for a number of periods until it becomes large enough that control is efficient. Once the invasion size is reduced, it is allowed to grow again and the process repeats itself.
Another policy implication arises when the marginal costs of control vary more with the invasion size than they do with control. As we shall see, a control cost function cannot satisfy this property and be a jointly convex function of control and the invasion size. Since the stylized facts seem to support the hypothesis that the invasion size has a strong impact on control costs for some invasions, there is a significant loss in generality if the cost function is assumed to be convex. In other words, for some invasions state dependent control costs are a natural source of non-convexities in the objective function.
The dependence of control cost on invasion size also raises interesting questions regarding eradication as an optimal policy. For example, the fact that eradication is optimal when the invasion size is large does not automatically imply that eradication is optimal when the invasion size is smaller and we show that there may be disjoint intervals of states from which eradication is optimal.
The main contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, it brings out precisely the joint implications of non-convex biological growth and state dependent control costs for the dynamics of an optimally controlled biological invasion and its long run behavior. Second, it characterizes the conditions under the optimal policy leads to: (i) eradication of an invasion from any size, (ii) eradication of small invasions but not large invasions, and (iii) non-eradication. These conditions are given in terms of the ecological and economic fundamentals of the model: the biological growth of the invasion, control costs, damages and the social discount rate.
3 There is a related literature on continuous time dynamic economic models. Skiba [1978] , Davidson and Harris [1981] and Brock and Starrett [1999] examine models with non-convex growth. Schmalensee [1977, 1979] consider non-convexities in the objective that arise due to fixed costs of harvesting a renewable resource.
5
The analysis of this paper is related to three subsets of the literature. In general terms, this paper contributes to the literature on optimal intertemporal allocation in one-sector dynamic economic models.
The vast majority of this literature is based on classical assumptions: a convex feasible set and a concave maximand that depends only on the control (usually consumption). There is some analysis of models where the feasible set is non-convex (among others, Majumdar and Mitra [1982] , Dechert and Nishimura, [1983] ) as well as models where the utility function depends on both the state and control (see, for example, Nyarko and Olson [1991] , and the collection of papers in Majumdar, Mitra, and Nishimura, [2000] ). Dawid and Kopel [1997] consider the case where the feasible set is convex but the objective function is non-concave. 3 The model of the current paper encompasses non-convexities and state-dependence in the objective function, and a non-convex production technology. To our knowledge there is no existing literature that considers all three of these non-classical features simultaneously. The methodology developed in this paper should prove useful in the analysis of other, non-classical dynamic economic problems.
The analysis in this paper is also related to the literature on optimal management of renewable resources [Clark, 1990, Olson and Roy, 1996] where the objective is to maximize the discounted sum of social welfare obtained from harvesting a useful biological resource. A key distinction between our analysis and the literature on growth and renewable resources is that in the latter, the capital stock contributes to the production of a good that yields positive social welfare. Hence, the existence of a strictly positive steady state is positively correlated with productivity and extinction is not optimal if there exists some stock from which the productivity of the resource exceeds the discount rate. For a biological invasion, the capital stock or invasion size contributes in a negative way to social welfare. This reverses the relationship between discounted productivity and incentives to preserve the invasive species.
Finally, our analysis contributes to the literature on the dynamic economics of invasive species control. Here, the extant literature is small. An early precursor and the most closely related paper is Jaquette's [1972] analysis of a discrete time biological population control model. Jaquette's analysis only considers the existence of an optimal policy and the monotonicity of the optimal state transition in a finite horizon problem. We examine the infinite horizon case in a model that admits both monotone and non-monotone policies, and we provide a more complete characterization of the different outcomes in terms of the economic and ecological fundamentals of the model. In an earlier paper [Olson and Roy, 2002] we examined a stochastic model where control costs are independent of the invasion size. This assumption is too restrictive to be useful as a positive theory in many applications. In addition, it has the normative implication that the optimal state transition function is always monotonic. The current paper characterizes the dynamics of an optimally controlled invasion for the more realistic and richer class of intertemporal allocation problems where control costs depend on the state. Other early applications of dynamic programming to the problem of pest management are reviewed by Shoemaker [1981] . These tend to focus on issues such as pesticide resistance and intra-seasonal pest management. Wilman [1996] and Knowler and Barbier [2000] examine models with an invasive predator whose prey is harvested for its economic value. Spatial dimensions of pest control strategies are examined in Brown, Lynch and
Zilberman. Sharov and Leibhold [1998] examine the economics of using barrier zones to control the spread of invasive species. Costello and McAusland [2002] consider the links between trade, protectionism and damage arising from exotic species introductions. Jensen [2002] examines optimal protection and damage mitigation in a model where the probability of invasion is exponentially distributed, but where there is no growth and spread of an established invasion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two develops the model. The basic optimality conditions that govern a controlled invasion are established in section three. To do so we use Dini derivatives to extend the envelope theorem of Mirman and Zilcha [1975] and Benveniste and Scheinkman [1979] to the case where the objective function and feasible set of time paths are nonconvex. The implications of non-convex growth and control costs that depend on invasion size are examined more closely in section four. We show that state dependent control costs can naturally lead to non-convexities in the objective function. Sufficient conditions are given for the optimal invasion transition to be governed by a monotone policy correspondence. In addition, we provide conditions under which the optimal invasion size in period t+1 is a decreasing function of the optimal invasion size in period t. The implications of each of these possibilities for public policy is examined. Section five studies the efficiency of eradication of an invasive species. Circumstances under which eradication does not make sense are examined in section six. Section seven illustrates the main results for a parametric form that by be useful for some applications. Concluding remarks are given in section eight and all proofs are in the appendix.
The Model
Let y t represent the size of the biological invasion at the beginning of time t and let a t represent the amount of control at time t. The invasion that remains at the end of period t is given by x t = y t -a t .
The invasion is assumed to grow and spread according to an invasion growth function y t+1 = f(x t ). The invasion growth function is assumed to satisfy the following properties:
A4. f x (0) > 1.
A5.
There exists an K 0 (k,4) such that f(x) < x for all x > K and f x (K) > 0.
Assumption A2 implies that once an invasion is eradicated it cannot recur. This paper does not address situations where re-invasion is a serious concern. Assumption A3 says that the invasion growth function is increasing in the size of the invasion. To be successful an invasive species must necessarily be able to sustain an invasion. Since one of the issues of interest is the economics of eradication, it makes sense to rule out situations where invasions are not biologically sustainable even if they are not controlled. This is the essence of Assumption A4. Assumption A5 simply reflects the fact that the spread of any invasion is bounded by climatic, geological or ecological factors. A simple consequence of this fact is that every invasion has a non-convex growth function. Therefore, no convexity assumptions are imposed on f(x).
The costs of control and damages caused by the invasion are denoted by C(a,y) and D(x), respectively. Control costs include both the direct costs of control and any indirect costs that may be associated with control, such as adverse effects arising from the use of chemicals. Derivatives are indicated by relevant subscripts, e.g. C a represents the partial derivative of C with respect to a. Let B4. C is convex in a. D is convex.
Assumption B2 rules out fixed costs and it implies that C y (0,y) = 0. Assumption B3 implies that damages are increasing in the size of the invasion, the costs of control increase as control increases, and that a given amount of control is cheaper to achieve from larger invasions. The assumption that C a (a,y) + C y (a,y) $ 0 means that if y # y' it is less costly to reduce the size of the invasion from y to x than it is to reduce the size of the invasion from y' to x. Assumption B4 gives standard convexity conditions. We do not assume that C is jointly convex in a and y. 4 Hence, our model allows for non-convexities in both the biological growth function and in the control cost function.
With the possible exception of differentiability and the exclusion of fixed costs, assumptions A1-A5 and B1-B4 represent minimal requirements met by the set of all possible invasions and they are assumed to hold throughout the paper.
A policy, B = (B 1 ,B 2 ,...), is a sequence of decision rules, B t , that specify a plan for controlling the biological invasion as a function of the previous history, h t = (y 0 ,a 0 ,x 0 ,...,a t-1 ,x t-1 ,y t ). That is, a t = B t (h t ) and V(y 0 ) = subject to y t = a t +x t and y t+1 = f(x t ).
Under A1-A5 and B1-B4, standard dynamic programming arguments imply that there exists a stationary optimal value that satisfies the recursion V(y t ) = Min [C(a t ,y t ) + D(x t ) + *V(f(x t ))] subject to 0 # x t # y t , y t = a t +x t and y t+1 = f(x t ), and that there exists a stationary Markov optimal policy whose decision rules are
0#x#y} and A(y) = y -X(y). A sequence (y t ,x t ,a t ) 0 4 that solves (2.1) is an optimal program from y 0 . Given an initial invasion of size y 0 = y and a selection x(y) from the stationary optimal policy X(y), an optimal program is defined recursively by y t+1 = f(x(y t )), x t = x(y t ), a t = a(y t ), t =0, 1,2,...
Controlled Invasions and their Basic Properties
Some invasions cause minimal damage and control is not cost effective. It is therefore useful to first identify the circumstances under which control makes sense. There are different ways to view the control of an invasion. One may be interested in control from an invasion of a particular size, control of an invasion of any size, or one may be concerned about control of the invasion immediately or at some future date. This motivates the following definitions. The first part of Lemma 1 provides a weak criteria for control to be optimal at some point. It says that if the invasion is allowed to grow unrestricted and, if at some future date the marginal cost of starting to control the invasion is less than the discounted stream of future marginal damages from that time onward into the indefinite future, then it is optimal to control the invasion at some point. The second part of Lemma 1 says that if the current marginal damages from an invasion of size y exceed the current marginal costs of starting to control the invasion at size y then control is optimal when an invasion is size y. This is because even a myopic social planner would undertake positive control in such a situation. If provides a somewhat weaker condition for an invasion to be globally controlled by comparing the marginal cost of an arbitrarily small control to the savings in current marginal damage and future marginal damages and control costs. When C aa +C ay $ 0 on S then B2 implies that inf a C a (a,y)+C y (a,y) = C a (0,y) + C y (0,y) = C a (0,y). Hence, if a change in control has a larger effect on marginal costs than a change in the invasion size, the requirement of Lemma 1c simplifies to C a (0,y) < D x (y) + *C a (0,f(y))f x (y).
Definition. (a) An invasion is a controlled invasion from y if there exists some t such that
A final observation is that in many instances the marginal costs of control will be decreasing in y. In such cases all of the conditions for controlling an invasion will be more likely to hold, the larger the invasion.
In the following let (y t ,x t ,a t ) 0 4 be an optimal program from y 0 . The next result characterizes the intertemporal tradeoffs between marginal costs and damages along an optimal program. It is important to note that the value function in non-convex models may not be differentiable so Lemma 2 cannot be obtained by applying standard envelope theorem arguments such as those of Benveniste and Scheinkman [1979] . Majumdar and Mitra [1982] use variational methods to obtain the Euler equation in a non-convex growth model. Our version of Lemma 2 generalizes the envelope theorem of Benveniste and Scheinkman by using an alternative approach based on the principle of optimality and the fact that Dini derivatives of V exist everywhere.
Corollary to Lemma 2c. If 0 < x t < y t and 0 < x t+1 < f(x t ) for all t then
This has a simple interpretation when the costs of control are independent of the size of the invasion (C y = 0 for all (a,y)). For an interior policy the optimal control equates the marginal costs of control with the discounted sum of marginal damages over time multiplied by the compounded marginal growth of the invasion. This is a simple cost-benefit criterion which balances the cost of removing a unit of the invasion against the discounted sum of current and future damages associated with that increment of the invasion. When the costs of control depend on the size of the invasion, the stream of future damages must be adjusted to account for the influence of the invasion size on future control costs. In addition, given that C a + C y $ 0, an interior dynamic optimum always involves at least as much control as the static optimum.
Finally, the fact that it is costly to achieve a desired end-of-period invasion size when the initial size is larger implies that larger invasions involve larger social costs.
Lemma 3. V(y) is continuous and non-decreasing.
The Policy Implications of Non-classical Control Cost and Invasion Growth Functions
In general, it is not reasonable to assume that the problem of controlling a biological invasion satisfies classical assumptions of a standard one-sector dynamic economic model. The transition function may be non-convex, and as an invasion is reduced to zero the marginal cost of control can vary more with the invasion size than it does with control. That is, it may be the case that C aa + C ay < 0. 5 As we shall see, this has implications for the dynamics of an optimally managed invasion and it also implies that the control cost function itself is also not convex on S.
Lemma 4. The control cost function C(a,y) cannot simultaneously satisfy C(0,y) = 0, C aa (a,y) + C ay (a,y) < 0 on int S and C(a,y) is jointly convex.
The significance of Lemma 4 lies in showing that state-dependent control costs can be a natural source of another type of non-classical behavior, namely non-convexities in the objective function. Even though these non-convexities complicate the analysis, it is the dependence of control costs on invasion state that is the primary determinant of the behavior of an optimal policy.
In the remainder of this section we examine the implications of non-classical assumptions for economic policy in a dynamic economic model and we attempt to provide some insight into the mechanisms through which non-classical assumptions affect the optimal value and policy functions. In addition, the different types of behavior that can occur under non-classical conditions are illustrated using a concrete example. 
Control costs are quadratic in a while damages are quadratic in x. The last term in C(a,y) allows for a flexible dependence of control costs on the invasion size, y. A quartic growth function is assumed to accommodate possible non-convexities. The invasion size is normalized so that its natural upper bound is one. The intrinsic growth rate, f x (0) = 1+" 1 " 2 " 3 . These functional forms allow reasonable flexibility to adjust the cost, damage and growth functions subject to the restrictions that the parameters vectors ", $ and ( must satisfy A1-A5 and B1-B4.
3.a. The Policy Implications of Non-convex Invasion Growth
Every biological invasion is eventually bounded by natural, ecological limits. A simple consequence of this fact is that every invasion has a non-convex invasion growth function. This has two important policy implications that are best examined by first separating the effects of non-convex growth from the effects of control costs. The simplest way to do this is to make control costs independent of the 6 The dynamic programming problem is solved numerically using the value iteration method on a state space grid interval of 10 -4
. The convergence criterion is a maximum percentage deviation in the value fuction of less that 10 -5 .
7 Formally, every selection from the optimal control policy correspondence, A(y), may be non-monotonic.
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invasion size so that social costs are convex. In this case, the only non-classical assumption is that growth is non-convex.
The first important policy implication of non-convex growth is that the value function may be non-convex. The second, and related, implication of non-convex invasion growth is that the optimal control policy may be a non-monotone function of the size of the invasion. 7 That is, it may be optimal to use more control for a smaller invasion than for a larger invasion. This is illustrated in Figure 1(b) for the same example. The economic rationale for a non-monotone control policy is that control reduces both current damages and the discounted future social cost of an invasion. The latter depends on the invasion growth rate and the discounted social cost of the invasion in future periods (the value function). When these are non-convex the future marginal benefit from a reduction in the size of an invasion may be nonmonotonic in the invasion size and it may be optimal to reduce control as the invasion size increases. This means that care must be taken in analyzing the optimality of observed control efforts. Observing a reduction in efforts to control an expanding invasion is not necessarily indicative of sub-optimal public policy.
3.b.. The Policy Implications of Control Costs that Depend on the Invasion Size
In this subsection, we examine the qualitative implications that arise when control cost, C(a,y), depends on both the amount controlled as well as the size of invasion. From Lemma 2c and its corollary it can be seen that the optimal control balances the current marginal control cost against a net marginal benefit that consists of two parts: a decline in current damage, and a change in future social costs resulting from reductions in the invasion size in future periods. When control costs are independent of the invasion size, reducing the current invasion size unambiguously reduces future control cost and damages.
However, when control costs depend on the invasion size, there is an opposing effect. Since the cost of control is decreasing in the invasion size, a reduction in future invasion states increases future control cost. Ceteris paribus, there is an incentive to reduce current control. From a policy perspective, models that ignore the effect of invasion size on control costs are likely to suggest an excessive control policy and may overstate the case for eradication.
Second, the effect of invasion size on marginal control cost has implications for the qualitative dynamics of optimal invasion paths. Recall that X(y) = y-A(y) is the optimal policy correspondence that indicates the invasion size that remains after control. The dynamics of the optimal invasion path depends directly on this policy. In a non-convex model the optimal policy may be multivalued. That is, there may be more than one optimal control from a given invasion size. Consequently, our characterization is based on the properties of the optimal policy correspondence. Lemma 5. If C aa (a,y) + C ay (a,y) $ 0 on S, then X(y) is an ascending correspondence and the maximal and minimal selections from X are non-decreasing functions. If the inequality is strict then every selection from X is non-decreasing.
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For any selection x(y) from X(y), the optimal time path for an invasion is determined by y t+1 = f(x(y t )). By assumption, f is an increasing function. If a change in control has a larger effect on marginal costs than a change in the size of the invasion then the optimal invasion transition function, f(x(y)), is an increasing function of the current invasion size. This has the following consequences:
Corollary to Lemma 5. a. The optimal path {y t } generated by the f(x(y)) is monotonic over time and the optimal invasion size converges to a steady state as t64.
b. If two invasions differ only in their initial size, then the invasion that is larger today is (weakly) larger
at all points in the future.
c. It is never optimal to let an invasion grow before it is reduced in size or eradicated.
d. If eventual eradication is optimal from an initial invasion size, y 0 , then eradication is necessarily optimal from every initial invasion size less than y 0 .
e. Eradication is more likely to be optimal when invasion size is small rather than when it is large.
f. The limiting behavior of a controlled invasion may depend on its initial state.
Under the conditions of Lemma 5 there are just three possibilities as far as eradication is concerned.
(a) Eradication is globally optimal and the optimal invasion path from every initial invasion size decreases to zero. This is true if, and only if, f(x(y)) < y for all y > 0.
(b) Non-eradication is globally optimal and the optimal invasion path from every initial invasion size converges to a strictly positive steady state. This corresponds to a policy of maintenance control where the invasion is managed at a positive level in the long run. A sufficient condition for this to be true is that there exists an ,-neighborhood of zero such that f(x(y)) > y for all y in (0,,).
(c) There is a critical invasion size for eradication such that eradication is optimal for all invasions whose initial size is less than the critical size while maintenance control is optimal for all invasions whose initial size exceeds the critical size. Under maintenance control the optimal paths converge to a strictly positive steady state. In fact, (a) and (b) can be seen as special cases of (c) where the critical standard of eradication is, respectively, infinity and zero. Once the invasion size exceeds 0.657, control is no longer optimal and the invasion grows until it reaches its ecological limits.
When control costs depend on the invasion size an increase in control has two opposing effects on future net benefits. First, it lowers future damages. Second, by reducing the invasion size it increases future control costs. The second effect provides an economic incentive to postpone control. If the marginal costs of control vary more with the invasion size than they do with control so that C aa + C ay < 0, then X(y) may be non-monotonic in y.
Lemma 6. Assume C aa (a,y) + C ay (a,y) # 0 on int S. If there exists some y < K such that 0 < X(y) < y then there is a neighborhood N(y) of y such that X(@) is descending on N(y) and the maximal and minimal selections from X are non-increasing functions on N(y).
Lemma 6 has the following implications for policy.
Corollary to Lemma 6. a. The optimal path {y t } is not necessarily monotonic and convergent over time.
Instead there may be long run fluctuations where the optimal path exhibits cyclical or even more complex dynamics. For example, it may be optimal to use periodic control where an invasion is allowed to grow unchecked for a number of periods until it becomes large enough that control is efficient. Once the invasion size is reduced, it is allowed to grow again and the process repeats itself.
b. It may be optimal to let an invasion grow before it is reduced and eventually eradicated.
c. The optimality of eradication from y 0 does not necessarily imply that eradication is optimal from an initial invasion size less than y 0 . Likewise, one cannot make general statements that eradication is more likely to be optimal if the invasion is small.
d. The limiting behavior of a controlled invasion may depend on its initial state.
In the presence of complicated dynamics, the possible scenarios for eradication and noneradication can no longer be described by a critical invasion size that bifurcates the state space into regions of eradication and non-eradication. There may be alternating intervals of invasion sizes from where eradication and non-eradication occurs.
Lemmas 5 and 6 depend only on the sign of C aa + C ay and hold independent of the convexity of the model. The conditions of the lemmas are sufficient, but not necessary, conditions for the optimal policy to be ascending or descending. Figure 3 shows that the non-monotonicity of X(y) and all of the conclusions of the Corollary to Lemma 6 may occur if C aa + C ay switches sign. The figure illustrates the optimal policy for Example 1 with parameters " = (0.25, 0.60, 2.0), $ = (4.0, 2.6, 2.2, 2.0, 0.0), ( = (4.4, 1.0) and * = 0.02. The growth function is identical to the specification used in Figures 1 and 2 . The key to this example is that C aa + C ay = 2.6 -6.6y 2 , which is positive for low values of y and negative for high values. The optimal policy has the following features:
(i) The optimal transition function, f( X(y)), is first increasing and then decreasing.
(ii) Eradication is optimal from both low invasion sizes in the interval (0,y) and high invasion sizes in the interval but it is not optimal from intermediate invasion sizes on the interval
. y y (iii) If the initial invasion size is in the interval then the optimal invasion size exhibits cyclical [ , ] y y dynamics.
(iv) The optimal control policy is non-monotone. Control is positive for low invasion sizes, there is an intermediate interval where no control is used, and control is positive again for high invasion sizes. Note that the interval of no control is not [ , ] . y y This example illustrates that when there is a sufficiently strong dependence of control costs on the invasion size, conventional wisdom about the relationship between the size of an invasion and the behavior of optimal policies does not necessarily hold. For this reason, public policy for the control of a biological invasion requires a good understanding of the economic and ecological fundamentals of the problem.
The Economics of Eradication
In this section, we consider the conditions under which it makes sense to eradicate an invasive species. The term eradication can have two meanings. In general it applies when the species is eradicated 9 The non-convex structure of the dynamic optimization problem is the reason the inequality has to hold over the entire range of control that would lead to an increase in the size of the invasion.
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in the long run and the invasion is controlled in a manner that reduces its size to zero in the limit. It can also have a narrower meaning in cases where the species is fully exterminated in the current period.
Eradication in the general sense includes both immediate eradication and the possibility that the species is fully eliminated within a finite number of periods.
It is intuitively clear that a first step towards eradication is a reduction in the size of invasion. We begin by giving a result about when it is economic for the current control to do so. and for all x 0 (f -1 (y),y),
Then every optimal program (y t ,x t ,a t ) 0 4 satisfies y 1 = f(x 0 ) < y 0 .
To interpret this result, first examine the static case where * = 0. Consider the set of controls that lead to an increase in the size of the invasion next period. If marginal damages exceed marginal costs for every control in this set, then can never be optimal to allow the invasion to increase in size. 9 In the dynamic case, marginal control costs are compared to the current and future marginal damages, adjusted for the effect of the invasion size on future control costs. The second term on the right hand side of the inequality in Proposition 1 is a lower bound on the effect that a reduction in the invasion today has on future damages and control costs.
We now characterize the economic and biological conditions under which eradication is optimal in the general sense where the size of invasion is reduced to zero in the long run. Whether eradication is optimal or not depends on the initial size of the invasion. If Proposition 1 holds for every invasion whose size is between zero and some positive level, ., then if the initial invasion size is below . it is optimal to reduce the size of invasion in every period and over time the invasion is eradicated.
Corollary to Proposition 1. If there exists a . >0 such that the invasion is currently controlled from every y 0 (0,f(.)), and if
for every y 0 (0,.] and for all x 0 (f -1 (y),y). Then, (eventual) eradication is optimal from every invasion of size y 0 (0,.]. If this condition holds for . = K, then global eradication is optimal.
The condition in the corollary implies that for any invasion of size below . , it is less costly to reduce the size of the invasion than to incur the current and future damages should the invasion be allowed to grow.
When discounted growth exceeds one from every invasion size below ., then eradication is optimal even if marginal damages are very low. The rationale is that if a fast growing invasion increases future damages and control costs more rapidly that the rate of discount then it makes sense not to allow the invasion to grow and the invasion should be eradicated from its current level. The condition for eradication becomes stronger with higher values of . . Thus, it is generally more likely for eradication to be optimal from small invasions than from large invasions.
If the marginal costs of control vary more with the amount of control than with the size of the invasion, then the optimal policy for controlling the invasion is monotone (Lemma 5). In that case, the efficiency of eradication depends on the economic and biological conditions at steady states and a tighter condition for eradication is possible. 
for all x 0 (0,K], then every optimal program converges to zero and eradication is globally optimal.
There are three differences between Propositions 2 and 3. First, Proposition 2 relies on a lower bound on future marginal damages while this is not necessary in Proposition 3. Second, Proposition 3 is a result about global eradication so the condition in the Proposition is required to hold for every possible invasion size. On the other hand, Proposition 2 can be used to evaluate the efficiency of eradication from small invasions; the conditions need not apply when the invasion is large.
Next, we characterize the circumstances under which immediate eradication is optimal, i.e., where the invasion is fully eradicated in the current period.
Proposition 4.
Suppose that for some y 0 (0,K], the invasion is currently controlled from every y 0 0 (0,f(y)) and that
Then, immediate eradication is optimal from y.
The criterion for immediate eradication balances the costs of removing the last unit of the invasion against the current and future damages that would be caused should the invasion be allowed to remain. The second term on the right hand side of the inequalities is a lower bound on the future damages associated with an arbitrarily small invasion. It is possible that the condition for immediate eradication may be satisfied for large y and not for small y. That is, immediate eradication may be optimal for a large invasion even if it is not optimal for a smaller invasion. Since Propositions 1 and 4 are not mutually exclusive there can exist circumstances where: eradication of small invasions is optimal, eradication is not optimal for medium size invasions, and eradication is optimal for large invasions.
These results on the economics of eradication have the following implications. First, eradication is more likely to be an optimal policy for invasions that have a higher discounted growth rate than it is for invasions that grow slowly. This might seem counter-intuitive, but it is because the benefits from control today are higher when an invasion expands rapidly. In addition, the benefits from control today are magnified further into the future when the discount rate is lower. Second, for some invasions economic considerations may favor eradication when the invasion is small, but not when the invasion is large. In such cases a rapid response may be necessary for eradication to justified. Finally, in the special case where the marginal costs of control at a=0 are insignificant, the criteria for eradication in Propositions 1, 2 and 4 essentially involve static benefit cost considerations that balance current marginal costs and damages. This is a consequence of the fact that C a (0,y) = 0 and C a (a,y) + C y (a,y) $ 0 imply inf 0#a#f(x)-x C a (a,f(x)) + C y (a,f(x)) = 0. Hence, the lower bound on future marginal social costs is relatively weak when marginal control costs are insignificant.
The Economics of Noneradication.
In this section we characterize the economic and biological environments under eradication is not optimal. Under these circumstances the optimal policy either involves no intervention, or suppression in order to reduce damages. Our first result rules out immediate eradication as an optimal strategy.
If the damages from an arbitrarily small invasion are less than the marginal costs of removing the entire invasion, then it is always optimal to allow some of the invasion to remain. There should be no control in the current period if, given the current invasion size, the marginal costs of initiating control exceed the maximum current and future marginal damages that can occur. This proposition focuses on the optimal policy from a given invasion size. For example Proposition 5b can be used to provide a condition for no control for small invasions. In general, however, the proposition does not rule out the possibility that eradication is optimal in the long run. That question is the focus of the next result.
Proposition 6. If C aa (a,y) + C ay (a,y) $ 0 on S and D x (0) + *C a (0,0)f x (0) < C a (0,0) then X(y) > 0 for all y and, in addition, for all y sufficiently close to zero A(y) = 0 and X(y) = y.
For an arbitrarily small invasion, if the damages compounded indefinitely at the discounted expected intrinsic growth rate are less than the marginal costs of eradicating the invasion then the optimal policy is not to control the invasion at all when it is sufficiently small. This implies that eventual eradication is not an optimal strategy from an invasion of any size.
Proposition 6 comes very close to providing necessary and sufficient conditions for sufficiently small invasions to be uncontrolled. This can be seen by a comparison of Proposition 6 with Proposition 1 evaluated as the invasion size approaches zero.
A final possibility is that eradication is optimal from small invasions but that it is not optimal if the invasion grows to be large. The last result can be used to help identify such outcomes.
Proposition 7.a. Suppose there exists an such that every invasion of size y $ is currently
controlled and that
Then from every initial invasion size y $ , the invasion size in every period is bounded below by
b. Assume C aa (a,y) + C ay (a,y) $ 0 on S. Suppose there exists an such that for every ,
damages for every invasion larger than , then it can never be efficient to reduce the invasion size
Application of the Results
This section uses the case of exponential control costs and damages to illustrate the application of the results. The aim is to demonstrate that the conditions are internally consistent and may be easily Hence, the optimal policy governing the invasion size is monotone if " > $, while if $ > " the optimal invasion size is governed by a decreasing policy on the interior of S. Table 1 summarizes the conditions for eradication or noneradication, given exponential cost and damage functions and any invasion growth function satisfying A.1-A.5.
The condition for both the Corollary to Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 is independent of $ so it is essentially the same condition that applies if control costs are independent of the invasion size. Further, the condition applies regardless of whether " > $ or $ > ". This means that in the case of exponential costs and damages, the efficiency of eradicating small invasions does not depend on the monotonicity of the optimal policy.
It is relatively straightforward to extend these results to other cost and damage functions. For example, what is important in most of the results are the marginal damages from an arbitrarily small invasion (either directly or because D x (0) is a lower bound on marginal damages from larger invasions).
In Table 1 , the conditions for Propositions 1, 2, 4, 5.a and 6 apply much more generally to any convex damage function where D x (0) = (, including the case of linear damages, D(x) = (x.
Conclusion
The results of this paper can provide the foundation for both a normative and a positive analysis of invasive species control. As such, they may help explain why some observed efforts to control invasive species involve repeated intervals where periods of inaction are followed by periods of significant control. In addition, the results show the importance of the initial invasion size in determining the optimal policy. Propositions 1 or 2 may apply when the invasion is small while Proposition 7 may simultaneously apply when the invasion is large. In such cases the optimal policy is path dependent and there is an economic rationale for eradication if the invasion is small, but not if the invasion is large.
The paper also illustrates the information that is needed to evaluate the economic efficiency of invasive species control. Estimates of the costs of control, damages from an invasion, and the invasion growth rate are required. These may be difficult to assess, particularly in the early stages of an invasion.
Yet this is precisely the time when prompt action can reduce future consequences.
There are a number of important issues related to invasive species problems that are not addressed in this paper. There are many circumstances where prevention may be the best control. Similarly, our model does not consider the possibility of re-invasion. Clearly, the value of eradicating an invasive species will depend on the likelihood that a new invasion might occur. Finally, many invasive species problems involve private actions where individuals do not consider the consequences for social welfare.
The design of policies that mitigate the conflicts between private incentives and social welfare is another interesting aspect of invasive species problems.
Appendix.
which a t > 0. [ ]
Dividing by , and letting , 6 0 implies
Since this contradicts the condition in the proposition it must be that T = 0 and A(y) > 0 for all y.
Proof of Lemma 2. For purposes of exposition the proof is divided into a sequence of subsidiary lemmas.
Define the lower, right and left Dini derivatives of V at y by Proof. Since a 1 > 0, x 1 is feasible from f(x 0 -,) for sufficiently small ,. By the principle of optimality it
). Once again, dividing by , and taking the liminf ,90 on both sides and simplifying completes the proof.
The proof of part a of Lemma 2 follows from Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 while combining Lemmas 2.1 and 2.4 yields part b. Part c is a joint implication of all four subsidiary lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 3. The cost functions C and D are bounded continuous functions on their relevant domains. Define the operator 'V(y) = inf C(a,y) + D(x) + *V(f(x)) subject to y = x + a. By the contraction mapping theorem ' maps the set of bounded continuous functions into itself. Hence, V is continuous. We now show that ' maps non-decreasing functions into non-decreasing functions. Suppose V is non-decreasing. Let x and x' be optimal from y and y', respectively where y < y'. Suppose x' < y.
Then x' is feasible from y and 'V(y) = C(y-x,y)
, where the first inequality is due to optimality while the second is due to B3. Now suppose that x' $ y.
The first inequality is due to optimality, the equality follows from B2, and the second inequality is implied by B3 and the fact that V is nondecreasing. inequality is due to convexity, the second uses C ay (a,y) < 0 and C y (0,y) = 0 for all y, while the last follows from C y (a,y) # 0 and a # y. Hence, the right hand side of (A.1) is positive, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 5. The proof is based on the monotone comparative statics principles originated by Topkis [1978] and uses the fact that C aa (a,y) + C ay (a,y) $ 0 implies that C(y-x,y) is submodular in (x,y). 
where the first and last inequalities follow from the principle of optimality. This sequence of inequalities implies that min[x,x'] 0 X(y) and max[x,x'] 0 X(y'). If C aa (a,y) + C ay (a,y) > 0 the middle inequality above becomes strict when x' < x. This yields a contradiction so it must be that every selection from the optimal policy correspondence is monotone.
Proof of Lemma 6. The argument is similar to the proof of Lemma 5. Let x 0 X(y) and x' 0 X(y') < y' for y # y'. We want to show that max[x,x'] 0 X(y) and min[x,x'] 0 X(y'). This follows immediately if x $ x' so suppose that x < x'. Since x' < y' it must be the case that x' # y for all y sufficiently close to y'. The assumption C aa (a,y) + C ay (a,y) # 0 implies C(y-x,y) + C(y'-x',y') $ C(y'-x,y') + C(y-x',y), that is C(y-x,y) is supermodular in (x,y). This is turn yields 0
where the first and last inequalities follow from optimality. This sequence of inequalities implies that x' 0 X(y) and x 0 X(y'). Hence max[x,x'] 0 X(y) and min[x,x'] 0 X(y'). The assumption that X(y') < y' is necessary to insure that x' is feasible from y 0 N(y').
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose not. Then there exists an optimal program (y t ,x t ,a t ) 0 4 where y 1 = f(x 0 ) $ y, i.e., x 0 $f -1 (y). Since, y 1 0 [y,f(y)], it follows that x 1 <y 1 . Therefore, using Lemma 2, we have
which violates the inequality in the statement of the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider y 0 0 (0,.] and the optimal policy generated by the maximal selection from X(y). (Under C aa (a,y) + C ay (a,y) $ 0, this policy function is non-decreasing in y.) It is sufficient to show that the optimal path generated by this policy is strictly decreasing over time. Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the set of optimal paths generated by the maximal selection from X(y). It is sufficient to show that complete eradication occurs on every path generated by this selection. From
Lemma 5, we know that this is an non-decreasing function and therefore, every optimal path generated by this selection is weakly monotone and hence convergent (they are all bounded). Suppose to the contrary that there is an optimal path generated by the maximal selection from X(y) which is bounded away from zero. Then, it must converge to a strictly positive optimal steady state y* = f(x*). Note that y 0 0 (0,K) implies that every optimal program is bounded above by K so that x* and y* lie in [0,K] . If x* 0 (0,K) then equation (3.1) implies C a (f(x*)-x*,f(x*)) = D x (x*) + *[C a (f(x*)-x*,f(x*))+C y (f(x*)-x*,f(x*))]f x (x*) which contradicts the inequality in the proposition. Also, y*= K = f(K) is not an optimal steady state as the inequality in the proposition implies C a (0,K)) < D x (K) + *[C a (0,K))+C y (0,K)]f x (K) = D x (K) + *C a (0,K))f x (K) which implies C a (0,K)) < [D x (K)/(1-*f x (K))]. The latter can be used to show that a program where the control is infinitesimal but greater than zero in period 0 and equal to zero every period thereafter dominates a program where a t =0 in every period. Hence, K is not an optimal steady state. Thus, it must be the case that every optimal path converges to 0. All sufficiently small invasions are currently controlled and
There exists a . such that eradication is optimal from every invasion of size y 0 (0,.]. It is optimal not to control an invasion of size y.
Proposition 6 " > ( + *"f x (0)
It is optimal not to control an invasion if it is of sufficiently small size. 
